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Contributory Trademark Infringement:




Trademark law seeks to prevent fraud and deception through the use of
a distinctive mark. Consumers identify certain marks as indicators of a prod-
uct's quality and authenticity. Moreover, if a product does not bear the rec-
ognized trademark, consumers are alerted that the item is likely inauthentic.
The invention of the Internet and the online marketplace has complicated
trademark law because consumers cannot physically inspect a product before
purchasing it. Thus, the risk of fraud and deception has increased, which
may harm consumers.
Indeed, trademark holders have experienced numerous challenges in the
past decade due to an increase in infringing conduct in the online market-
place. According to the Internet Crime Complaint Center (a partnership of
the FBI and the National White Collar Crime Center), "internet auction fraud
was by far the most reported offense, comprising 44.9% of referred com-
plaints."2 Furthermore, counterfeiting is an estimated $600 billion-a-year
global industry.3 This nation's "businesses and industries lose about $200
billion a year in revenue and 750,000 jobs due to the counterfeiting of mer-
chandise."4 Both consumers and trademark holders are directly impacted by
counterfeit sales. As counterfeiters steal the identity of a product, the value
of that brand name deteriorates.5 Additionally, trademark owners are hin-
dered in their efforts to sell and market their product if a brand name carries
1. Virginia Welch is a May 2011 candidate for Juris Doctor at Southern Methodist
University Dedman School of Law. She graduated summa cum laude from
Southern Methodist University with a Bachelor of Arts in Advertising and a
minor in Sociology. She would like to thank her family for their love and
support.
2. Justin N. Redman, Post Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.: Establishing a Clear,
Legal Standard for Online Auctions, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 467, 470 (2009) (citing
Internet Crime Report for 2006, National White Collar Crime Center and Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2006_IC3
Report.pdf (last visited August 8, 2010)).
3. Ambrose Clancy, Faking It: Nothing Phony About Profits in the Knockoff Busi-
ness, LONG ISLAND BUSINESS NEWS, July 2, 2009, available at http://libn.com/
blog/2009/07/02/faking-it-nothing-phony-about-profits-in-the-knockoff-busi-
ness/.
4. Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Customs Announces
International Counterfeit Case Involving Caterpillar Heavy Equipment (May
29, 2002), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news-releases/
archives/legacy/2002/52002/05292002.xml.
5. Redman, supra note 1, at 470.
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significantly less value to the consumer.6 Consumers can neither determine
the source nor judge the quality of a product if they cannot distinguish the
difference between an authentic or a counterfeit product.
It is apparent that something needs to be done to block the sale of coun-
terfeit goods in the online marketplace. Great debate has emerged regarding
who should be responsible for policing infringement on the Internet. Should
trademark holders be held responsible since it is their brand that they are
trying to protect? Or should online marketplaces be held accountable since
they provide the platform for this unlawful conduct and benefit financially
from such activity? Because the prevalent practice of Internet sales contin-
ues to increase in popularity, allocating responsibility solely to one party
would prove extremely onerous to the blamed party. The ideal solution
would be to create some kind of 'burden-sharing' arrangement where both
the mark holder and online marketplace have certain policing responsibili-
ties. With a 'burden-sharing' arrangement, neither party would be unduly
burdened, consumer confusion would be curbed, and trademark holders
could maintain the integrity of their brand. Thus, in order to ensure that the
consumer is protected from sham products and tainted marketplaces, the
courts and the legislature must stop pointing fingers and encourage
cooperation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Purpose of Trademark Law
Intellectual property is comprised of trademark, copyright, and patent
rights. Intellectual property is further defined as a "category of intangible
rights protecting commercially valuable products of the human intellect."7 A
trademark acts as a "limited property right in a particular word, phrase or
symbol."8 Specifically, a trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof [that is] (1) used by a person, or (2) which a
person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce . . . . to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manu-
factured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown"9 A trademark is essentially a commercial substitute for
one's signature that designates the source of goods or services.1o Trademark
law seeks to protect both the buying public by preventing consumer confu-
sion and the trademark holder by preventing infringement and unfair misap-
6. Id.
7. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009).
8. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 219 (3d Cir.
2005).
9. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
10. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 1630.
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propriation by competitors.I Thus, an inevitable tension exists because
trademark law tries to serve two different purposes at the same time.12 How-
ever, avoiding consumer confusion is at the core of both of these rationales
and is the common concern driving trademark law.13 The objectives of trade-
mark law are interrelated because "you cannot protect consumers without
protecting businesses and you cannot protect businesses without protecting
consumers."l4 Consequently, when trademark infringement occurs, the con-
sumer and trademark holder are both harmed.15
To plead a case of trademark infringement, a trademark owner must
show two things: (1) that the trademark was used in commerce, and (2) that
this use created a likelihood of confusion and/or diluted the mark.16 Trade-
marks do not need to be federally registered in order to be protected against
unauthorized use.' 7 The Lanham Act defines "use in commerce" as, "the
bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely
to reserve a right in a mark."18 Congress defined "use in commerce" nar-
rowly so as "to include uses likely to establish a connection between a mark
and a product or service in the minds of consumers."19
The Lanham Act, while over fifty years old, still operates as the current
regulatory authority of trademark law in the United States.20 Although the
Lanham Act is the principal source of protection, state common law and stat-
utory protections are also available.21 Because the Lanham Act leaves much
up to the judicial imagination, courts have been allowed to impose their own
11. Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Transformation of Trademark Law, 38
N.M. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008).
12. Id.
13. Jessica A.E. McKinney, Note, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc.: A Conscious
Analytical Shift, 95 IOWA L. REv. 281, 286 (2009).
14. Brendan J. Witherell, The Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act in an
Expanding Global Economy, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1090, 1112 (2007).
15. Id.
16. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
17. Katie Pimentel, Comment, Trademark Use as Keywords: A Comparative Look
at Trademark Use as Keywords in Paid Search and Digital Public Perform-
ance Rights for Sound Recordings, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 553,
557 (2010).
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
19. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1345, 1351 (2008).
20. Andrew Brabender, Note, Internet Trademark Disputes: A Modified Approach
to the Applicability of the "Goods or Services" Requirement in the Lanham
Act, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 115, 115 (2006).
21. John T. Cross, Contributory Infringement and Related Theories of Secondary
Liability for Trademark Infringement, 80 IoWA L. REV. 101, 127-28 (1994).
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views and beliefs on trademark law.22 While the Lanham Act was enacted to
unify national trademark protection, the operation of trademarks must con-
tinue to evolve in order to keep up with the ever-changing economy.
B. Contributory Trademark Infringement
An example of the evolution of trademark law lies in the trend of trade-
mark holders to battle not only direct infringers, but also third parties who
provide the direct infringers with tools for their illegal actions.23 The con-
cepts of secondary liability have been used to hold third parties liable for
counterfeiting activities even though they were not the parties who had di-
rectly infringed on a trademark.24 Examples of liable third parties include
pharmaceutical manufacturers, department stores, gasoline suppliers, land-
lords, flea market operators, and swap meet operators. 25 Anti-counterfeiting
efforts require combating direct infringers as well as secondary infringers.
In the absence of any provision in the Lanham Act for assigning liability
for third parties, courts have borrowed from tort law to reflect the notion that
"[one] who induces another to commit a fraud and furnishes the means of
consummating it is equally guilty and liable for the injury."26 A party is
liable for contributory infringement "when he, she, or it knowingly contrib-
utes to or intentionally induces another's infringement of an intellectual
property right."27 A manufacturer or distributor may be liable for contribu-
tory trademark infringement when a product is marketed in a way that in-
fringes on another's trademark.28 While the concept of contributory
trademark infringement has a long history and is widely recognized in case
law, there is no express statutory foundation establishing such liability.29
Rather, contributory trademark infringement is a judicially created doctrine
22. Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We Think: Trademark Defenses in
a "Formalistic" Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 909 (2009).
23. Alison A. Besunder, Righting the Wrong: Recovering Remedies for Trademark
Infringement and Counterfeiting, 968 PAT/PLI 59, PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADE-
MARKS, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI ORDER No.
19111, 68 (2009).
24. Id. at 70.
25. Id.
26. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1355 (citing William R. Warner & Co. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1924)).
27. Note, Central Bank and Intellectual Property, 123 HARv. L. REv. 730, 731-32
(2010).
28. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
29. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1351; see also Grant Airmass Corp. v.
Gaymar Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (explaining
that "liability under the Lanham Act has been construed to extend beyond those
who actually misrepresent goods or directly place such goods in commerce").
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established by the United States Supreme Court case of Inwood Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.30
C. The Inwood Test
The 1982 holding in Inwood renders a third party liable if it "intention-
ally induces another to infringe a trademark or if it continues to supply its
product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trade-
mark infringement."31 While the Inwood test for contributory infringement
was applied in the manufacturer-distributor context, courts have since ap-
plied the test in other contexts. 32
I. CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY ON THE INTERNET
In 2005, the Supreme Court widened the possibilities of secondary lia-
bility against Internet Service Providers (ISPs), online auctions, and others
who provide the platform used by counterfeiters to practice their trade even
though these means may have some other legitimate purpose. 33 Metro-Gold-
wyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster involved a distributor of file-sharing
technology which was used by consumers to illegally download music.34 Al-
though the case involved copyright infringement, the opinion shed light on
how courts might approach and analyze secondary trademark infringement
on the Internet, stating:
It is not only that encouraging a particular consumer to in-
fringe a copyright can give rise to secondary liability for the in-
fringement that results. Inducement liability goes beyond that, and
the distribution of a product can itself give rise to liability where
evidence shows that the distributor intended and encouraged the
product to be used to infringe. In such a case, the culpable act is
not merely the encouragement of infringement but also the distri-
bution of the tool intended for infringing use.35
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not offered similar guidance to
cases involving secondary trademark infringement on the Internet. Given
30. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982); See also,
Tifany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 502 (stating "contributory trademark infringement is
a judicially constructed doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in Inwood").
31. See Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854.
32. Redman, supra note 1, at 478; see also Lauren Troxclair, Search Engines and
Internet Advertisers: Just One Click Away From Trademark Infringement?, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1365, 1376 (2005) (discussing third party liability).
33. Besunder, supra note 22, at 70.
34. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919
(2005).
35. Id. at 940.
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that the Lanham Act does not address contributory trademark liability and the
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue, courts continue to resort to the
outdated Inwood test to determine whether an ISP or online marketplace
should be liable for contributory trademark infringement.36 Tiffany v. eBay, a
recent case presented to the Southern District Court of New York, is a quin-
tessential example of the struggle courts have when deciding these cases.
Tiffany v. eBay was the first case in the United States to address the issue of
contributory trademark liability of auction websites.
II. CURRENT LAW
A. Tiffany v. eBay
Tifany v. eBay highlights the recent dilemma of determining how to
deal with third parties who supply direct trademark infringers with a platform
for their illegal trade. The highly monitored dispute between Tiffany & Co.
and eBay was presented to the Southern District of New York in 2007.37
Tiffany sued eBay for the sale of counterfeit Tiffany silver jewelry on eBay's
website and alleged six causes of action, including direct trademark infringe-
ment, contributory trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair competi-
tion, direct trademark dilution, and contributory trademark infringement.38
The court sided with eBay, holding that Tiffany failed to meet its burden
with regards to all asserted claims and that eBay's use of the Tiffany marks
constituted protective, nominative fair use. 39
B. Court's Rationale: Contributory Trademark Infringement
To determine whether eBay was liable for contributory trademark in-
fringement, the court asked "whether eBay continued to provide its website
to sellers when eBay knew or had reason to know that those sellers were
using the website to traffic in counterfeit Tiffany jewelry."40 The interpreta-
tion of the phrase "knows or has reason to know" became a heated battle of
semantics in the case.41 Both parties agreed that eBay had general knowl-
edge that some portion of Tiffany goods sold on eBay may have been coun-
terfeit.42 Tiffany argued that the Inwood test only requires this general
36. Redman, supra note 1, at 468.
37. Besunder, supra note 22, at 81-83.
38. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 470.
41. Id. at 507 (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854
(1982)).
42. Id. The court found sufficient evidence of generalized knowledge from: (1)
Tiffany's demand letters; (2) Tiffany's Buying Programs' results, which it
shared with eBay, indicating that 73.1% of Tiffany items purchased in its 2004
Buying Program were counterfeit; (3) thousands of Notice of Claimed Infringe-
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knowledge of infringing activities, while eBay advocated for a narrower in-
terpretation of the Inwood test and argued that specific-not general-
knowledge should be required to prove contributory trademark infringe-
ment. 43 The court held that "while eBay clearly possessed general knowl-
edge as to counterfeiting on its website, such generalized knowledge is
insufficient under the Inwood test to impose upon eBay an affirmative duty
to remedy the problem."44
The court found support in its conclusion from precedent and policy.
The court noted that other courts have rejected a standard that would "reach
conduct that only might be infringing" and have opted to require a "higher
showing that a defendant knew or had reason to know of specific instances of
actual infringement."45 Moreover, the court looked to copyright law which
deems generalized knowledge insufficient to impose contributory liability.46
Holding that "Tiffany's general allegations of counterfeiting failed to provide
eBay with the knowledge required under Inwood," the court next addressed
whether eBay was willfully blind to the infringing activities.47
ment forms (NOCIs) that Tiffany filed alleging a good faith belief that certain
listings were counterfeit or infringing on Tiffany's marks; and (4) numerous
complaints from buyers stating that they had purchased what they believed to
be fake Tiffany jewelry through the eBay website. See id.
43. Id. at 507-08.
44. Id. at 508-10. The court noted that while the Second Circuit has not defined
the requisite knowledge a defendant must have to satisfy the Inwood standard,
generalized knowledge is insufficient for four reasons. First, the Inwood test
focuses on individual infringers through its singular language-a manufacturer
or distributor is contributorily liable when "it continues to supply its product TO
ONE whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringe-
ment." Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854. Second, at least one district court in the
Second Circuit has held that "trademark plaintiffs bear a high burden in estab-
lishing 'knowledge' of contributory infringement." Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall &
Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 420. (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Third, the fact that
"courts have been reluctant to extend contributory trademark liability to de-
fendants where there is some uncertainty as to the extent or the nature of the
infringement." Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 508-09. Fourth, "neither Fontovisa
nor Hard Rock Cafe support the notion that generalized knowledge is suffi-
cient." Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 510.
45. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 510.
46. Id. n.37 (citing A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th
Cir. 2001) ("The mere existence of the Napster system, absent actual notice and
Napster's demonstrated failure to remove the offending material, is insufficient
to impose contributory liability."): see also Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.
Supp. 2d 1082, 1088-90 (C.D.Cal. 2001) (holding that generalized notice of
copyright infringements was insufficient to establish knowledge for the pur-
pose of contributory liability).
47. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 511-14 (holding that none of the following were
sufficiently specific to impute to eBay with the required knowledge: Tiffany's
2010] 367
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The concept of willful blindness comes from the Inwood test, which
finds liability when a plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant "knows or
has reason to know" of a third party's trademark infringement.48 The Tiffany
court stated that "willful blindness means a person must suspect wrongdoing
and deliberately fail to investigate."49 Tiffany claimed that eBay was will-
fully blind because it could have done more to prevent the listings of counter-
feit goods but failed to take such measures.50 However, the court held that
eBay was not willfully blind to evidence of trademark infringement on its
website.51 In holding that eBay was under no affirmative duty to search for
potential infringers, the court noted that "willful blindness requires 'more
than mere negligence or mistake' and does not lie unless the defendant knew
of a high probability of illegal conduct and purposefully contrived to avoid
learning of it, for example, by failing to inquire further out of fear of the
result of the inquiry."52
The court continued its discussion on contributory trademark infringe-
ment by addressing whether eBay "continued to supply" its product in in-
stances where it knew or had reason to know of infringement.53 The court
noted that courts have declined to find liability where a defendant takes "ap-
propriate steps" to "cut off the supply of its product or service to the in-
fringer" once it has sufficient knowledge.54 The court concluded that eBay
did in fact take "appropriate steps" to terminate its services to infringers be-
cause once eBay was notified through the Verified Rights Owner (VeRO)
program of a counterfeit auction item, eBay removed the listing, warned the
seller and buyer, cancelled the fees associated with the listing, and instructed
the buyers to not carry out the sale. The court concluded the opinion by
demand letters, the "five-or-more" rule, buying programs, NOCIs, and buyer
complaints).
48. Id. at 513 (stating that "the 'reason to know' standard can be satisfied by a
showing that the defendant was willfully blind to the infringing activity").
49. Id. (referring to Hard Rock Caf6 Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc.,
955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992); Louis Vuitton, S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584,
590 (7th Cir. 1989); Monsanto Co. v. Campuzano, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1275
(S.D.Fla. 2002)).
50. Id. (noting that the fact that eBay adopted further anti-counterfeiting measures
after Tiffany initiated the suit does not indicate that it could have employed
such efforts any earlier).
51. Id. at 515.
52. Id. (citing Nike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352,
1369-70 (S.D. Ga. 2003)).
53. Id. at 516 (stating that the Inwood test "requires a plaintiff to prove that the
defendant continued to supply its product to an infringer once it had knowledge
of the infringement").




highlighting the fact that the law is clear in placing the burden on the trade-
mark owner to police its mark.55
Though the decision provided some clarity regarding contributory trade-
mark liability, it raised the question of when auction websites should be re-
quired to investigate and take action against trademark infringement on their
sites.
C. Secondary Liability: Trademark Law v. Copyright Law
Trademark and copyright law are similar in the fact that courts have
imposed secondary liability to both areas of law based on common-law tort
theories. The differences between trademark and copyright law are a result of
their differing rationales and policies. First, while copyright protection stems
from a direct constitutional grant of power,56 the Supreme Court has rejected
such support for trademark protection57 Second, copyright law gives authors
the exclusive rights to the original work as an incentive to create and share
valuable works of art with the public.58 However, trademark law "focuses on
ensuring the integrity of the marketplace by protecting consumers against
confusion as to the source of products."5 9 Thus, trademark law seeks to pro-
tect consumers by improving the quality of information in the marketplace.60
Unlike copyright law, there is no federal policy that encourages the creation
of more trademarks.61
Because of these "fundamental differences," the Supreme Court has said
that secondary liability for trademark infringement should be more narrowly
drawn than that for copyright infringement.62 Tiffany v. eBay serves as a
reminder that secondary trademark infringement is generally more difficult to
prove than secondary copyright liability. In order to prevail on a contribu-
tory infringement claim under copyright law, the plaintiff must prove: (1) an
55. Id. at 527.
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have power ... to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.").
57. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1879) (holding that Congress's
power to regulate trademarks can only come from its power to regulate inter-
state commerce).
58. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
59. Elizabeth K. Levin, Note, A Safe Harbor for Trademark: Reevaluating Secon-
dary Trademark Liability After Tiffany v. eBay, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 491,
504 n.97 (2009) (citing Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95
CAL. L. REv. 941, 971 (2007)).
60. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1366.
61. Levin, supra note 58, at 504.
62. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
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act of direct infringement by someone other than the secondary party; (2) that
the secondary party had knowledge of the infringing activity; and (3) that the
secondary party induced, caused, or materially contributed to the infringe-
ment.63 So it would seem that the test for contributory copyright infringe-
ment is not much different from the test for contributory trademark
infringement. However, unlike trademark law, vicarious copyright liability
may be found if a party has the right and ability to supervise the infringing
activity and obtains a direct financial benefit from the infringing activities.64
Thus, vicarious copyright law recognizes liability when a defendant profits
directly from the infringement and has the right and ability to control the
direct infringer, even if the defendant lacked prior knowledge of specific in-
fringement. Had the Tiffany items sold on eBay been copyrighted instead of
trademarked, the outcome of the case may have been more advantageous for
Tiffany since the crux of the court's decision turned on the absence of spe-
cific knowledge.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is an area of copyright
law that is unmatched in trademark law. Congress passed the DMCA to help
tackle the type of problem confronted in Tiffany v. eBay.65 Title II of the Act
creates a safe harbor from copyright liability for online service providers if
they follow the "notice and takedown" provisions enumerated in the statute.66
The DMCA operates as a guide to service providers on how to avoid direct,
contributory, and vicarious liability for their infringing customers. The safe
harbor protects ISPs from liability for all monetary relief but does not affect
the question of ultimate liability.67
In order to satisfy the requirements of the safe-harbor provision, the
online service provider must block access to-or completely remove-alleg-
edly infringing material if it receives a notification of infringing activity.68
Additionally, Section 512(c) of the Act demands that copyright owners abide
by the strict notification requirements in order for the safe harbor to require
that service providers prevent access to the infringing material.69 While en-
63. Levin, supra note 58, at 512 (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
64. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971) (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d
304 (2d Cir. 1963)); see also A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001).
65. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(stating that the central dispute in the case is who should bear the burden of
policing the trademark).
66. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
67. Levin, supra note 58, at 514.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
69. Fara S. Sunderji, Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory Trade-
mark Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay Inc.
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couraging the robust development and expansion of electronic commerce, the
DMCA simultaneously provides "strong incentives for service providers and
copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringe-
ments that take place in the digital networked environment."7o While there is
no analogous safe harbor available for trademarks, many scholars and com-
mentators believe that the persistent problem highlighted by Tiffany v. eBay
should stimulate Congress to enact a similar statute for trademarks.71
D. ANALYSIS
Individuals, judges, and companies may all hold different beliefs regard-
ing who should bear the burden to police the trademark. But one thing is
certain: something needs to be done. Trademark law is at a standstill, and
has been for years. Meanwhile, technology, as well as e-commerce, contin-
ues to grow and advance.72 Congress has not updated trademark law since
the Lanham Act of 1947 and the standard used for contributory trademark
liability dates back to before the Internet even existed.73 The Lanham Act
was designed for a physical marketplace where the consumer actually views
the product and has a better opportunity to detect an infringing mark. Con-
gress did not anticipate the creation of the Internet when it wrote the Lanham
Act in the early 1930s. Therefore, the Lanham Act provisions do not address
trading goods across such modern mediums.
Reflecting the substantial uncertainty regarding how to apply existing
laws to internet commerce, the Second Circuit suggested that "attempting to
apply established trademark law in the fast-developing world of the Internet
is somewhat like trying to board a moving bus . . ."74 Congress has been
content with allowing courts to "develop the basic contours of trademark
protection" and respond to the changes of trade, commerce, and invention.75
However, the Tiffany v. eBay decision illustrates the consequences of such a
position and highlights the importance of establishing a uniform standard that
both online auctions and trademark holders can rely on. Great debate has
been generated regarding whether this uniform standard should be based on
case law (relying on Tiffany v. eBay to act as a guide) or on a statutory
Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 909, 928-30 (2005); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(c)(1).
70. S. REP. No. 105-90, at 20 (1998).
71. See Levin, supra note 58, at 517-27; see also Redman, supra note 1, at
489-90.
72. Bartholomew, supra note 10, at 2.
73. Courts still refer to the standard established in Inwood. See Inwood Labs., Inc.
v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
74. Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997).
75. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use De-
bate, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1703, 1710-11 (2007).
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solution, and the solution is yet to be determined. Many commentators argue
that Congress should look to the Tiffany v. eBay decision for guidance and
enact a safe harbor to regulate trademark infringement on online auction sites
in order to avoid the piecemeal development of secondary trademark
liability.76
The ultimate dispute in Tiffany v. eBay turned on who should bear the
burden of policing Tiffany's trademarks on eBay's website. There were
valid arguments on both sides regarding who should bear such a responsibil-
ity. Placing the burden on the trademark holder is problematic because
smaller companies that are not able to afford the extensive policing efforts
necessary to satisfy the court's burden will be forced to close down, while
the online auction site makes a profit off of the infringing activity. Moreo-
ver, internet companies are more likely to be equipped with the necessary
technology to implement antifraud programs. Conversely, trademark owners
are the experts in being able to identify their products and detecting potential
infringers. Ultimately, there is a strong argument that the trademark holder
should be required to take ownership in the majority of the policing efforts
because it is the integrity of their brand that makes their business a success or
failure. Self-policing a company's brand is necessary in order to prevent
competitors from acquiring the rights in the mark. Additionally, courts
should not place hefty burdens on ISPs because it will discourage develop-
ment on the Internet, and it is likely that companies like eBay will pass the
increased costs on to the customers through heightened service fees.
Interestingly, the court in Tiffany v. eBay focused all of its attention on
the interests of the two parties, yet it did not consider the central interest of
trademark law-consumer protection. The consumer is rarely discussed in
the court's analysis and, thus, is not a factor in deciding who should be re-
sponsible to police the trademark. If consumer protection was the ultimate
objective, it is likely that the court would have focused more on burden-
sharing rather than burden-shifting because it would be a much more effi-
cient, genial, and definite way to prevent consumer fraud. By having both
the trademark holder and the online auction website bear certain responsibili-
ties, there would be a decrease in counterfeit products present on the site and
thus a decrease in consumer confusion. While the court ultimately placed the
burden on Tiffany, the trademark holder, to police its mark, the court's deci-
sion was influenced by all of the antifraud measures eBay had implemented
and its cooperation with Tiffany in expeditiously removing the listings after
each Tiffany complaint. Analyzed from this point of view, the court's deci-
sion supports more of a burden-sharing relationship. The court should have
focused more on this burden-sharing relationship that requires online-auction
websites to monitor their site with the brand owner's assistance. Because
placing the responsibility solely on one party is not desirable, another option
is for Congress to amend the Lanham Act to include a safe harbor provision.
76. Levin, supra note 58, at 518-21.
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A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Statutory Solution
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is a good blueprint for a statu-
tory solution, as it encourages burden-sharing instead of burden-shifting po-
licing efforts. Despite the fundamental differences between copyright and
trademark law, a statutory enactment similar to the safeguards contained in
the Act would afford more certainty in the realm of trademark infringement
on the Internet and eliminate unnecessary lawsuits. Such a scheme would
allow trademark owners to quickly have allegedly infringing material re-
moved and provide a safe harbor for service providers to avoid liability for
infringing misconduct on their sites.
In deciding how to modernize trademark law, there are advantages and
disadvantages to relying on case law precedent versus enacting a statutory
solution. Many scholars have encouraged the enactment of a provision in
trademark law that mirrors the provisions and safe harbors contained in the
DMCA.77 Relying on Congress to enact a statute similar to the DMCA
would promote a uniform standard that holds both parties responsible for
policing efforts and would reduce the costly litigation of unnecessary law-
suits. In Tiffany v. eBay, Judge Sullivan noted that Congress bears the ulti-
mate responsibility of changing the law.78 However, relying on a safe harbor
provision may be troublesome. First, there is a risk that a safe harbor may
act as more of a ceiling instead of a floor. When online auction sites only
have to meet certain requirements in order to avoid liability, it is not likely
that they will adopt antifraud measures above and beyond what is required.
Instead, if liability is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
the specific circumstances of each party, ISPs will have an incentive to im-
plement more anti-fraud measures in order to avoid liability.79 Additionally,
77. Id. at 522-24. Moreover, the statute should establish procedures for proper
notification and counter notification. Levin proposed that:
[T]he statute should require online auction sites to meet the following con-
ditions: (1) the online auction site must not have actual knowledge of the
infringing activity and must not be aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent; (2) if the site has the right and ability
to control the infringing activity, it must not receive a financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing activity; and (3) upon receiving
proper notification of claimed infringement, the site must expeditiously
take down or block access to the material.
Id.
78. "Policymakers may yet decide that the law as it stands is inadequate to protect
ights of owners in light of the increasing scope of Internet commerce and the
concomitant rise in potential trademark infringement." Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v.
eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
79. Examples of specific circumstances may include the anti-fraud tactics each
party has already implemented, the financial ability of the party to implement
further anti-fraud measures, the size of the business, the time it takes the party
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courts are afforded greater flexibility if they rely on case law to set the prece-
dent, rather than a statute. This also permits courts to more readily modify
the law of trademarks to take into account developments and changes in the
online marketplace. Congress cannot accurately predict what the online mar-
ketplace will be like in the near future, and the procedure for amending statu-
tory law is a fairly lengthy one.
E. CONCLUSION
The introduction and growth of the Internet has increased the sale of
counterfeit goods and services. Similarly, the Internet has raised numerous
issues pertaining to the regulation of online counterfeit activity. Enforcement
and prosecution of the individuals who sell counterfeit goods online proves
to be a complicated task. This is because the companies and individuals who
sell these sham products are often difficult to trace and can easily move their
location. Trademark law is certainly at a crossroads, and the conflicting judi-
cial interpretation is further evidence of the need for clarification of the law.
Seeing that the online marketplace will only continue to grow and become
more pervasive, the law of trademarks must provide guidance and answers to
trademark holders, online websites, and consumers about the next chapter in
trademark law. It is crucial that the judicial system or legislative branch
offer such guidance in order to avoid an influx of lawsuits. How trademark
law will adapt to technological change remains to be seen.
Technology continues to alter the marketplace and the way companies
do business. Moreover, the entrance of third-party facilitators of transactions
has complicated who should be held liable for trademark infringement. Un-
fortunately, the Lanham Act has not followed this development, which has
led to many courts interpreting and applying the Act's infringement provi-
sions differently. As noted earlier, the original provisions of the Lanham Act
sought to codify trademark law, eliminate judicial obscurity, and enable
prompt and effective relief.80 Congress needs to go back to the drawing
board and offer the same clarity it provided when it enacted the Lanham Act
in 1946. To provide the most effective and positive resolution, Congress
should draw from the advantages of statutory reform and common-law gui-
dance. Congress should enact a safe harbor similar to the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. However, to encourage trademark holders and online mar-
ketplaces to take additional steps to prevent fraud and deception, Congress
should note that meeting these requirements does not ensure absolute immu-
nity from liability. In doing so, a universal standard will be available and
consumer protection will be heightened because online marketplaces and
trademark holders will still have an incentive to implement as many anti-
fraud measures as feasible.
to respond to reports of infringing activity, each party's willingness to cooper-
ate in combating infringers, etc.
80. See Witherell, supra note 13, at 1097.
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